What is the difference between a statement and a proposition?

  • I'm doing a MOOC on mathematical philosophy and the lecturer drew a distinction between a proposition and a statement. This is very puzzling to me. My background is in math and I regard those two words as synonymous. I looked on Wikipedia and it says:

    Often propositions are related to closed sentences to distinguish them from what is expressed by an open sentence. In this sense, propositions are "statements" that are truth bearers. This conception of a proposition was supported by the philosophical school of logical positivism.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition

    This also went right over my head. I (naively) regard both a proposition and a statement to be well-formed formulas that, once a suitable interpretation is chosen, have the ability to be either true or false. For example 2 + 2 = 4 is a proposition or statement because once I assume the Peano axioms along with the usual interpretations of the symbols '2', '4', '+', and '=', this statement is capable of being determined to be true or false.

    Can anyone shed some light?

    Did your lecturer provide any examples?

  • Leitgeb distinguishes between statements, which are declarative sentences (he calls them 'descriptive sentences'), from propositions, which, unlike statements, are not linguistic objects. Propositions are the sort of objects that can have truth-values. E.g., [that snow is white] is a true proposition (Lecture 2-1).

    Once the distinction is made, the key idea is this: statements express propositions, which are then said to be true or false. E.g. "snow is white" is a statement that itself doesn't have a truth-value, but instead expresses the proposition that snow is white, which happens to be true. That's pretty much it.

    As regards your "2 + 2 = 4" example, Leitgeb could say this: "2 + 2 = 4" and "two plus two equals four" are two different statements that express the same proposition. If you call them both 'proposition', then since the two statements are syntactically distinct, you'll be committed to the claim that "2 + 2 = 4" and "two plus two equals four" are different propositions (this might be okay with you, but I think something is wrong with that). You might find the following analogy between algorithms and programs useful: given a single algorithm (~proposition), there are often multiple programs (~statements) that implement it.


    Leitgeb, Hartmann (2014 Spring) Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (Coursera).

    "... statements express propositions, which are then said to be true or false. E.g. "snow is white" is a statement that itself doesn't have a truth-value, but instead expresses the proposition that snow is white, which happens to be true." -- Is this a syntax/semantics kind of thing? As in, "Snow is white" isn't true or false until I choose a model in which to interpret it: a meaning for the words "snow" and "white," and a particular planet whose weather I'm interested in. Am I close?

    Lecture 2 is developing toward Tarski's indefinability of truth theorem, so it's essential that Leitgeb develop the object/meta language distinction. I think the statement/proposition distinction is one of the bricks he uses to build a foundation for that task. So yes, it's a syntax/semantics kind of thing. But "snow is white" isn't a proposition even if predicates 'is snow', 'is white' and the logical constant '∀' are interpreted; ∀x(Snow(x) → White(x)) is a proposition, which becomes true/false depending on the interpretation, but "snow is white" is just a string of symbols.

    "A proposition is what remains when you take the letters away". Like for physical objects, where we distinguish between the sentence "a red bicycle" and the actual physical object which is a red bicycle.

    Alas! The linked `Coursera` course, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy", is now deprecated. Fortunately, I've taken it already, long time. But still...

    @AdeelAnsari yeah, it's a pity. It was a wonderful opportunity for philosophy students, hopefully it does exist in some form, somewhere

    are you saying "sentences" instead of "staements" in your third paragraph on purpose? or do you mean to make a distinction?

    @peter Good observation. Statements are sentences, so it's technically fine, but you're right, there is no reason not to be consistent and use "statement" in that paragraph instead of "sentence" with an implied "declarative" modifier. I'll go ahead and add your improvement

  • In philosophy of language (and metaphysics), statements are linguistic objects, like sentences of a natural language. Propositions are (traditionally understood as) the meanings of sentences (of a language) (in a context of utterance).

    To illustrate:

    The German statement "Schnee ist Weiss." expresses the same proposition as the English statement "Snow is white."

    The distinction is arguably not immediately relevant for model-theoretic semantics of formal languages. Very few (if any) take the well-formed formulas of a formal language of mathematics to express propositions, although the connection between the semantics of formal languages and the semantics of natural languages is a hotbed of linguistic and philosophical issues of active research since (at least) Montague.

    "weiss" being an adjective doesn't get a capital letter.

  • Propositions are truth-bearing items, essentially dwelling in language; however, abstracted from the specific features of any particular language, indexicals fixed and references resolved. As such, the sentences 'snow is white' and 'der Schnee ist weiß' express the same proposition. 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' expresses the same proposition as well via different routes. But this is not bound to entail that this proposition is independent of language. One may get a grip on this point by trying to conjure up a proposition that could be not expressible in language. To emphasise the point, it may be remarked that the usage "propositional logic" is more appropriate than "sentential logic" is.

    Hence, the view that propositions are not linguistic objects is deficient. Likewise, viewing a proposition as a meaning is a category mistake; meaning cannot be true or false.

    Taking a true proposition as reflecting a fact carved out of reality (in the broadest sense) subject to the constraints of language is sufficient to grasp the thread running across many philosophical contexts.

    The term 'statement' is too general with respect to 'proposition' and is proper to employ when one does not need to commit oneself to certain propositions singled out like theorems in mathematics.

  • I hope the following statements help you see the difference.

    A proposition is a type of (logical) statement.
    A statement does not have to be a proposition (logical).

  • Proposition is just a declarative statement which doesn't depend on the language in which it's being said. That means if you specify something has proposition, then you are specifying the substance of what it is saying rather than its grammar, usage of words etc.

    Whereas statement is language specific and always contain the same proposition of what it is saying though it differs grammar, word usage etc.

    For Ex 1. The fact that "unicorns are fake" can be written as "ยูนิคอร์นเป็นของปลอม" in thai. In both the languages the propositions are the same but the statements differ.

    1. The fact that "sun doesn't rises in the west" can be written as " It is not the case that sun rises in the West " or " it is the case that the sun doesn't rises in the West". In all the 3 cases the statements differ because of word usage. Still convey the same proposition.

    Statements do NOT have to be written or spoken. Gestures and body language can also Express a statement. For instance you should agree if I hold a gun to your temple against your will I am making a statement. Traffic guards use hand gestures to guide traffic by telling some cars to stop all without a word or written language. Statements do not have to be true or false, whereas propositions do need to meet that requirement. All statements are not meaningful and by definition cannot be false. Sentences can be declarative. But propositions are not sentences which you acknowledge already.

  • Well the question you pose indicates that you believed that the math definition was the end all be all and then reality struck. You found out the math definition was strictly in the context of math. Well why not start off teaching that way? The topic you study is NOT logic but strictly called "Mathematical Logic". There are other types of logic. Math is not the only field that has a logic component. Philosophy has one, Psychology has one, Rhetoric has one, etc. You must not assume all logic is logic. This is where you went wrong.

    In philosophy, propositions are defined as mental components. They do not have physical properties or attributes. They don't apply to your human senses. You can't see or hear a proposition. What humans do then is EXPRESS the mental component into a given language to rely the idea to other human beings. The key here is propositions are not physical. Statements on the other hand must be physical.

    A statement outside of math is any physical communication method to relay an idea to another human being. This communication does not have to be verbal or written. You may tend to think of statements as verbal or written. This is an assumption because this is what you are used to and aren't directly told otherwise. A traffic sign relays a message such as to STOP or slow down. Me pointing a loaded gun at you relays a message which is a statement. If you understand the message then the communication is a statement for certain. This does not mean if you cant understand the message there is no statement. Hand gestures can relay a message. If someone can insult another person with just body gestures that is a STATEMENT. I don't literally have to say what I am thinking if I use gestures. A gorilla charges at you in a threatening manner is making a clear statement without being able to understand English. In my youth my mother would make statements with just her looks. I would see disgust on her face if I misbehaved in her presence but she was too far away from me to yelll at me or smack me for acting the fool when I knew better. Most of the latter examples clearly do not provide information on something being true or false. In math you were likely told statements are true or false (without specifically being told the domain of that discourse was IN THIS CLASSROOM). All statements do not require something to be true or false. There are also such things as meaningless statements which are neither true or false. We do know all literally meaningful statements can be translated as declarative sentences. All propositions can also be expressed as declarative sentences. But do not think they are identical because of this similarity.

    In summary, a proposition is a mental concept or idea that is expressed to hold a truth value of either true or false (and specifally cannot be both or neither). Controversy will arise about what true or false means here. Scientists think only in literal sense verification whereas a philosopher can understand what objective knowledge is. That is in science if I can't show you a unicorn the scientist will say my claim "all unicorns are white" is false. Basically no sense verification then there is no truth. Objective knowledge doesn't have the sense verification requirements. I can say objectively "there is a God" which by definition must be either true or false but I the speaker may not know this to be true or false. Me not being aware of the TRUTH VALUE does not mean there is NO TRUTH VALUE. Objective expresses the idea that the truth value is independent of my awareness or my senses. Time will eventually tell the value. You are not likely to hear this in math as that is not the purpose.
    I would interpret true proposition to mean the objective knowledge context unless the proposition is blatantly otherwise. Hence why "all unicorns is white" is NOT FALSE. At best it is a meaningless statement. If so it would fail to be a proposition. So again I slipped in another example there. Some statements are not propositions. All literally meaningful statements can Express propositions. Literally meaningful here means the physical connection to what is said. If I say "Al is tall as an Oak" he either is literally tall as the oak or he is not. Of course that case is not literal but just illustrating if it were then we have fulfilled the requirements of a proposition and a literal meaningful statement.

    no decent scientist would declare "all unicorns are white" false before he is certain of the existence of a differently colored unicorn. assuming there are no unicorns, (the proposition expressed by) this statement is true.

    @Peter, I was expressing that scientific knowledge is based on reality & statements about non existing objects are deemed false immediately. Secondly, there is no way a scientist can be certain about anything by definition. Science must be falsifiable by definition & can never be certain. Thirdly there is always the argument our senses can deceive us so we conclude incorrectly. Plenty of scientists have made errors even some of the most prestigious scientists. People can err. Deductive reasoning is more reliable & yields certainty without depending on the our senses for knowledge.

    how are statements about non existing objects false? the world outside of maths can't be that different. in here we call it vacuous truth.

    @Peter, the real world is outside of Maths. You are acting like everything can be translated into math. This is an error. No one outside of maths will say a claim not in line with the 5 senses is true. So if I say I am the chosen one or Batman people will ignore me. For 95 percent of people reality is sense verifiable. If x is not sense verifiable 95 percent of people outside of math class or philosophy will deem the claim about x FALSE. Average people don't want to hear about vacously true, trivial truths, truth tables and so on. Usually the higher classes and the elites have time for that.

    i'm not sure you understand. how does "i am batman" fit into this? how do you define to be batman?

    @Peter, we all know what the character Batman represents. It is easy to look up eventhough person is not in reality. Let's not be dishonest. Definition has nothing to do with practicality or reality 100 percent. To say I am Batman as per the DC comic character is the only definition and it is not realistic. People know that and deem my claim to being Batman false. Partly because the comic book character has no existential import like unicorns.

    but then you're clearly not him. where do you see a vacuous truth in that?

    @Peter, I can make a vacuous trtuth: if I am Batman then unicorns exist. Neither entity exist in reality & would be deemed false in reality & by scientific standpoint. However the issue is some vacuous truth do not apply to reality while some do. I can make if then arguments that are valid & clearly apply to reality. I can also make nonsensical if then arguments of the same form that are valid but do not apply to reality. How is is child supposed to know when the so called logic applies to reality or not? Next if the set is empty then it is nonsensical to claim the statement true or false.

    try to stay on topic please. you claimed that vacuous truths are usually deemed false outside of mathematics and your example was "i am batman". i was trying to understand how you think "i am batman" is a vacuous truth. i think it's plain false and has nothing to do with "all unicorns are white", which is obviously true assuming there are no unicorns.

    @Peter, would you agree that any conditional statement is vacously true if the antecedant is assumed true? My claim is "IF I am Batman, then Unicorns are white animals". By truth table you would assign the Batman part is true then the conditional is vacously true by definition. Is this so or not? Secondly some conditional statements do not apply to reality while others do. So the issue is sometimes the if then arguments apply to reality and sometimes they don't.

    " @Peter, would you agree that any conditional statement is vacously true if the antecedant is assumed true? My claim is "IF I am Batman, then Unicorns are white animals". By truth table you would assign the Batman part is true then the conditional is vacously true by definition. " absolutely not. i stop here.

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Content dated before 7/24/2021 11:53 AM